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David Mullan*

The Declaratory Judgment:
Its Place as an Administrative Law
Remedy in Nova Scotia'

1. Introduction
In recent years there has been considerable writing throughout the
Commonwealth on the potential of the declaratory judgment as a
remedy for reviewing unlawful administrative action. 2 It is not my
purpose in this note to add to the already ample general discourse on
this topic. Rather, I will be concentrating on some particular aspects
of the remedy, aspects which have been brought into prominence by
recent legislative changes and judicial decisions.
The new Nova Scotia Rules of Civil Procedure 3 raise several
interesting questions concerning the availability of the declaratory
judgment as an administrative law remedy in this province,
particularly in the area of the inter-relationship between declaratory
relief and other forms of remedy. These matters were discussed in
part by the Nova Scotia Supreme Court (Appeal Division) in Lord
*David Mullan, Associate Professor of Law, Dalhousie University.
1. Portions of this note are based on an address which I delivered on December 8,
1973 at the Dalhousie Continuing Legal Education Conference on Administrative
Law Remedies. The text of that address has been published by the Dalhousie Law
School Public Services Committee. See Administrative Law Remedies (ed. H. N.
Janisch) (Halifax: Faculty of Law, Dalhousie University, 1974) at p. 44 - "What
Use Can and Should be Made of Declaratory Remedy in Modem Administrative
Law?" I would also like to express my thanks to my colleague Professor Hudson
Janisch for his helpful comments on drafts of this note.
2. Aside from coverage of the subject in all the standard textbooks, the following
represent the most important recent writing on declaratory relief: I. Zamir, The
DeclaratoryJudgment (London: Stevens, 1962); D. T. Warren, "The Declaratory
Judgment: Reviewing Administrative Action" (1966) 44 Canadian Bar
Review 610; S.M. Thio, "Locus Standi and the Declaration" (1967) 30 Mod. L.
R. 205; J. F. Garner, "Locus Standi in Actions for a Declaration" (1968) 31 Mod.
L.R. 512; Garth Nettheim, "The Place of the Declaratory Judgment in Certiorari
Territory" (1969) 6 Sydney L.R. 184; B. C. Gould, "Anisminic and Jurisdictional
Review" [1970] Public Law 358 at pp. 368-371; G. I. Borrie, "The Advantages of
the Declaratory Judgment in Administrative Law" (1955) 18 Mod. L.R. 138; I.
Zamir, "The Declaratory Judgment v. The Prerogative Orders" [1958 ] Public Law
341.
3. The new Rules of Civil Procedure were madeunder section 42 of the Judicature
Act, S.N.S. 1972, c.2 and came into force on 1st of March, 1972.
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Nelson Hotel Ltd. v. City of Halifax.4 Particular attention will be
paid to that decision not only in so far as it concerns the new Rules
but also because of other more general aspects of the availability of
the remedy which were dealt with by the court. Prominent among
these was the problem of the standing requirements for the grant of
the remedy and this is a matter also considered very recently by the
Supreme Court of Canada in Thorson v. Attorney-General
(Canada).5 The potential impact of that decision on the declaration
as an administrative law remedy will be discussed. Finally I will
comment on the effect of the Federal Court Act 6 on the availability
of the declaration as a mode of questioning the decisions of federal
statutory authorities.
2.

DeclarationsUnder the Nova Scotia Rules of Civil Procedure

The new Civil Procedure Rules in Nova Scotia have not altered the
basic provision for the grant of declaratory relief. 7 The new Rule
5.14 continues to be a direct copy of the equivalent English Rule of
the Supreme Court8 and provides: "No proceeding shall be open to
objection on the ground that only a declaratory judgment or order is
sought thereby, and the court may make binding declarations of
right whether or not any consequential relief is or could be
claimed." While Rule 5.14 does not suggest radical changes in the
law governing the availability of declaratory relief, there are other
rules in the new code which lead in that direction. Furthermore,
some of the rules relating to orders in the nature of the prerogative
writs may have the effect of diminishing the advantages of the
declaration over the prerogative writs as an administrative law
remedy.
Prior to the new Rules, a declaration could not be sought in
combination with one of the prerogative writs. 9 Conversely, the
4. (1972) 4 N.S.R. (2d) 753; (1972) 33 D.L.R. (3d) 98 (N.S.S.C. - A.D.)
5. (1974) 43 D.L.R. (3d) I (S.C.C.)
6. S.C., 1970-71-72, c.l.
7. See Order XXV, r. 5 of the Rules of the Supreme Court made under the
Judicature Act, R.S.N.S. 1950, c.32.
8. Ord. 15, r. 16.
9. See Zamir, supra, note 2 at p. 96, and Klymchuk v. Cowan (1964) 45 D.L.R.
(2d) 587 (Man. Q.B.) -Certiorari could not be claimed along with a declaration
and damages. See, however, Robert F. Reid, Administrative Law and Practice
(Toronto: Butterworths, 1971) at p. 400 where he refers to a case in which
declaratory relief and mandamus were combined in the one proceeding:- Canadian
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prerogative writs could not be sought in combination with
declaratory or injunctive relief nor in combination with a claim for
damages. 10 In some situations this made the declaration a more
attractive remedy and ranked alongside its other advantages as the
appropriate remedy for challenging the validity of legislation both
primary and subordinate,"1 for reviewing the actions of domestic
non-statutory bodies 12 and for calling into question exercises of
power by the Crown. 1 All these involved matters beyond the reach
of the prerogative writs. Beyond this, as a further matter of
procedure, it was difficult theoretically to obtain leave to adduce
14
oral evidence on an application for one of the prerogative writs
nor were the pre-trial aids of discovery and interrogatories
available. 15 In contrast, in an action for a declaration, oral evidence
was always admissible and discovery and interrogatories were
available.1 6 Here too was another procedural advantage in seeking
declaratory relief, particularly where there was a disputed fact
situation, not easily resolvable by affidavit evidence.
Under the new Rules, however, the situation has been changed
significantly. First, Rule 5.01 allows for the joinder of "several
causes of action in the same proceeding". A possible interpretation
of this is that not only can a declaration now be sought in
combination with an application for orders in the nature of the
prerogative writs but also that damages can be claimed in
combination with an application for such an order, thus offsetting
Oil Companies v. London [1956] O.R. 878 (Ont. H.C.). However, this possibility

was not feasible in Nova Scotia where prior to the new Rules a writ of mandamus
could only be sought from the Appeal Division of the Supreme Court, except in
vacation. See Re Fairbanks (1969) 1 N.S.R. (1965-69) 616; 5 D.L.R. (3d) 657
(N. S. S.C.).
10. Ibid.
11. See e.g. Nelson v. City ofDartmouth (1964) 45 D.L.R. (2d) 183 (N.S.S.C.).
12. See e.g. O'Laughlin v. The Halifax Longshoremen's Association (1970) 15
D.L.R. (3d) 316 (N.S.S.C. - T.D.); reversed (1972) 3 N.S.R. (2d) 766; (1972)
28 D.L.R. (3d) 315 (N.S.S.C. -A.D.).
13. Section 15 (2) of the Proceedings Against the Crown Act, R.S.N.S. 1967,
c.239.
14. See Zamir, supra, note 2 at p. 315, f.n. 74. See also Reid at pp. 325-328 and
S. A. de Smith, Judicial Review of Administrative Action (London: Stevens, 3rd
ed., 1973) at p. 379. For a recent example however where oral evidence was
admitted without apparent question in a certiorariapplication see Re McLeod and
Maksymowich (1973) 38 D.L.R. (3d) 251 (N.T.T.C.).
15. See Barnard v. National Dock Labour Board [1953] 2 Q.B. 18 at p. 43
(C.A.).
16. See Zamir, supra, note 2 at p. 315.
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one of the significant advantages of the declaration under the former
regime.
The first of these possibilities was dealt with in the Lord Nelson
Hotel 17 case, where an application for declaratory and injunctive
relief was combined with an application for an order in the nature of
the prerogative writ of prohibition. After setting out Rule 5.01,
Jones J., in delivering the judgment of the court stated: "In view of
these Rules there appears to be no impediment in this Province to
combining an application for prohibition with an action for
declaratory relief and an injunction. It does not follow, of course,
that all three remedies will be granted. The appropriate form of
relief is a matter for the trial Judge to determine." 18
The thrust of this statement, as far as counsel drafting pleadings
are concerned, is that there is generally no longer any cause to be
concerned about the incompatability between declaratory relief and
orders in the nature of the prerogative writs. Indeed, the best move
under the new Rules is probably to claim all feasible review
17. Supra, note 4. In the Nova Scotia Reports, the judgments of the Trial Division
and the Court of Appeal are included together. The Trial Division decision is also
reported at (1972) 31 D.L.R. (3d) 755.
18. Ibid., at p. 774 (111). It is, as a postscript, interesting to note that a declaration
was not granted ultimately when the Lord Nelson case returned to the Supreme
Court. An order in the nature of prohibition was the only remedy found necessary
in the end. See Lord Nelson Hotel Ltd. v. City of Halifax (No. 2) (1973) 39 D.L.R.
(3d) 539 (N.S.S.C. - Gillis J.) This perhaps exemplifies the point that while
declaratory relief has achieved parity with the other forms of relief under the new
Rules, it will seldom be necessary for the court to make a declaration. As before,
the more blunt instruments of quashing and prohibiting will be all that are necessary
in the vast majority of cases. As a practical matter it also deserves to be noted that
there are considerable doubts about the availability of a declaration for
non-jurisdictional error of law (see footnote 76, infra). Moreover, even if the
remedy is available for such errors, there are questions about its effectiveness. A
declaration merely declares; it does not set aside. Non-jurisdictional error of law
traditionally has been seen as rendering a decision voidable rather than void. Does
this mean that a declaration in such cases can be ignored by the decision-maker and
that the original decision, though voidable, remains effective? There may also be a
problem, even if the decision-maker wishes to give effect to the declaration, in that
the empowering statute may not confer authority on the decision-maker to alter or
review the original decision. This is not seen as a difficulty where the original
decision is void because of jurisdictional error. This has been taken to mean that
there is simply no decision. Quashing is not strictly required and a declaration is
sufficient. The original decision is regarded as a nullity which cannot form a basis
for further action and may be ignored with impunity. (Discussed by de Smith,
supra, note 14 at pp. 462-464). Suffice to say, for present purposes, that these
questions have not been satisfactorily resolved in either Canada or the United
Kingdom.
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remedies and leave the determination of the appropriate relief until
the hearing. Of course, the Rule will not excuse counsel having to
establish to the satisfaction of the court their entitlement at common
law to one or more of the specified remedies claimed in the
pleadings. However, even this is not avoided under the muchvaunted Ontario Judicial Review Procedure Act. ' 9 Section 2 of that
statute still requires that the applicant for the new comprehensive
judicial review remedy demonstrate his entitlement to relief by
reference to the grounds for review under the historic remedial
structure. 20 Indeed, it could be suggested cynically that the only
advantage of the Ontario legislation over the Nova Scotia Rules in
this matter is that the Ontario legislation dispenses with the need to
use the names of the old remedies in drafting the pleadings.
Does it also follow from the judgment in the Lord Nelson case
that a claim for damages may now be brought in combination with
an application for an order in the nature of one of the prerogative
writs? This of course would mean a significant diminution in the
value of the declaration over those remedies. 20 a However,
despite the seemingly comprehensive language of Rule 5.01 and the
judgment of Jones J. in the Lord Nelson case, this may not
necessarily be so.
It is important to realize that under the new Rules declaratory
2l
relief can be sought in two separate forms - by way of an action
or by way of an originating notice (application inter partes).22 In
contrast, proceedings for orders in the nature of the prerogative
writs can only be commenced by way of an originating notice*23
Prior to the new Rules, damages could only be sought in
combination with a declaratory action and the new Rules clearly
contemplate that damages will continue generally to be claimed by
way of action rather than by way of the simpler originating notice
19. S.O. 1971, c.48.
20. Section 2 refers specifically to all the old forms of remedy and states that the
Divisional Court may award "any relief that the applicant would be entitled to" in
those proceedings.
20a. It is worth noting that in Ontario, where damages or other forms of monetary
relief are being claimed for unlawful administrative action such a claim cannot be
combined with an application for judicial review to the Divisional Court under the
Judicial Review Procedure Act. Such proceedings still have to be commenced on
their own or in combination with an action for a declaration in the Ontario High
Court.
21. Rule5.14.
22. Rule 9.02.
23. Rule 56.02.
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procedure. 24 This raises immediately two inter-related questions:
(1) Can a claim for damages ever be combined with a claim for
declaratory relief through the originating notice procedure, rather
than by action? (2) Because claims for orders in the nature of the
prerogative writs have to be commenced by originating notice rather
than by way of action, does this preclude the possibility of claiming
damages in combination with them?
While the judgment in the Lord Nelson case would seem to
suggest superficially that Rule 5.01 allows for the combination of
all forms of proceedings whether they be commenced by way of
action or originating notice, it is reasonably clear that the judge
probably did not intend to go that far. The declaration, as with the
other remedies in that case, was sought by way of originating
notice. As actions are heard in open court 2 5 and originating notice
applications in chambers 26 it is fairly safe to predict that the same
conclusion would not have been reached had this been a case of an
attempt to combine an action for a declaration with an originating
application for an order in the nature of prohibition. Notwithstanding the width of Jones J's statement there would seem to be an
irreconcilable incompatability in such a situation.
Thus, in so far as an action remains the usual method of claiming
damages under the new Rules, there is probably little possibility of
combining an action for damages with an application for an order in
the nature of one of the prerogative courts. However, attention must
also be paid to Rule 9.02. This provides as follows:
A proceeding, other than a proceeding under Rule 57 and Rules 59 to
61,
(a) in which the sole or principal question at issue is, or is likely to be a
question of law, or one of construction of an enactment, will, contract
or other document;
(b) in which there is unlikely to be substantial dispute of fact;
(c) which may be commenced by originating application, originating
motion, originating summons, petition or otherwise under an
enactment;
shall be commenced by filing an originating notice (application inter
partes) in Form 9.02A in a proceeding between parties, and by an
originating notice (ex parte application) in Form 9.02B in an ex parte
proceeding.
24. Rule 33, "Assessment of Damages", deals entirely with damages in the
context of a trial.
25. Section 34 of the Judicature Act which allows for the exclusion of the public in
certain cases clearly contemplates the hearing of actions in open courts.
26. Rule 37.01.
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This Rule not only suggests that there are limitations on the ability
to commence proceedings for declaratory relief by way of an action
but also that, in many situations where damages are sought, an
originating notice will be the appropriate method of proceeding.
The section is mandatory in effect and presumably applies where
damages are certain, liquidated or agreed and the dispute is
essentially one of law without a substantial fact determination
element. The difficult subclause of the Rule is 9.02 (c) and what
exactly this means is not clear. 2 7 Arguably, in so far as there is no
express prohibition in the Rules on seeking damages by way of
originating notice, the subclause operates as no real restriction. If
this interpretation is sustainable, then, having regard to Rule 5.01,
as interpreted in the Lord Nelson case, there may be many occasions
on which a claim for damages can be combined with an originating
notice claiming relief in the nature of the prerogative writs, or
declaratory relief, subject to the reservation that where there are
substantial factual disputes the appropriate way of proceeding will
still be by way of action in combination with a claim for a
declaration.
The new Rules contain nothing specific on the use of oral
evidence in applications for orders in the nature of the prerogative
writs. However, Rule 9.02 (b) suggests inferentially that the
originating notice procedure is not the place for the settlement of
disputed issues of fact. Because of this, the courts may still be
reluctant to allow oral evidence either as a supplement to or in the
place of affidavit evidence in applications for orders in the nature of
the prerogative writs. This probably means a continued role for the
declaratory form of action in judicial review situations where there
is a contest on the facts. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that
the Rules relating to discovery and interrogatories are on their face
perfectly general in their operation, 2 8 applying to both actions and
originating applications. This at least indicates some room for the
resolution of factual disputes within the originating application
procedure, albeit at the pretrial stage.
27. Discussed by the Appeal Division in Province of Nova Scotia v. F. G.
Connolly (1972)4 N.S.R. (2d) 271 at p. 281, where Cooper J. A. expressed doubts
as to whether the subclause was governed by the ejusdem generis rule of statutory
interpretation, thereby suggesting that it should be given a broad rather than
restrictive meaning.
28. Rules 19.01 and 20.01. They may, of course, still be read as implicitly limited
to proceedings commenced by way of action.
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In summary, there has probably been some lessening in the
significance of the declaratory form of action as an administrative
law remedy in this province because of the new Rules: (1) The
ability to combine all forms of administrative law remedy in one
proceeding will tend to diminish the separate identity of all the
remedies to a certain extent. (2) The availability of damages in
certain situations in combination with orders in the nature of the
prerogative writs affects the unique role of the declaration. (3) This
is also true of the extension of discovery and interrogatories to
applications for orders in the nature of the prerogative writs.
Nevertheless, as already seen, the action for a declaration will still
have considerable advantages as a method of resolving judicial
review matters involving factual disputes. As well, the declaration
will continue to be the appropriate direct method of challenging the
validity of legislation, primary and subordinate, for reviewing the
decisions of domestic or non-statutory bodies and for questioning
exercises of power by the Crown. Finally, and perhaps, as far as the
new Rules are concerned, this is the most significant factor, there is
a limitation period of six months from the date of the decision under
challenge, for commencing proceedings for an order in the nature of
certiorari. 2 9 No such limitation obtains as far as the declaration is
concerned. This means that, where more than six months have
elapsed from the date of a decision, the declaratory
form of action will, subject to the discretion of the court,2 9 a be the
only appropriate direct method of obtaining review of that
decision.
3.

Other Dimensions of the Lord Nelson Hotel Decision

(a) The Declarationas an Atlernative to Orders in the Nature of
the Prerogative Writs. Aside from the guidance given in the Lord
Nelson case as to the meaning of the new Rules, the decision has
significance in two other respects. First, it deals with the availability
of declaratory relief as an alternative to orders 'in the nature of the
prerogative writs. Secondly, it attempts to elucidate the standing
requirements necessary to obtain the remedy.
29. Rule 56.06.
29a. This discretion may of course be exercised against the applicant on the basis
of undue delay in seeking relief. Nevertheless this is not as rigid as a strict six
month limitation period in that a delay of greater than six months may well not be
undue.
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One of the major stumbling blocks to the development of the
declaration as an administrative law remedy in Canada and, more
particularly, Ontario, seems to have been the notion that a
declaration was not available as an alternative to the prerogative
writs. This proposition was accepted by the Ontario Court of Appeal
in Hollinger Bus Lines v. Ontario Labour Relations Board30 and,
undoubtedly, this decision has had some impact.3 1 The effect of that
decision was virtually to confine the availability of a declaration to
situations where it was being sought together with ancillary relief
such as damages or where it was being sought as an original remedy
by someone seeking a declaration as to his rights.
Historically, there is some justification for believing that English
courts at one time espoused this point of view. 3 2 However, it is now
quite clear that the availability of an alternative remedy, such as a
prerogative writ, goes to the court's discretion to issue a
declaration-not its competence. 3 3 Moreover, there is good reason
for believing the Hollinger rule has not gained too much acceptance
outside of Ontario. In a recent study of Supreme Court of Canada
decisions in the area of administrative law, from 1949-71, Professor
P. W. Hogg has demonstrated that on a number of occasions the
Supreme Court of Canada has used the declaration as a review
instrument where the prerogative writs were also clearly available. 3 4 In addition, Smith J. of the Manitoba Queen's Bench Division
in Klymchuk v. Cowan3 5 identified the problem of the availability of
a declaration in the face of the prerogative writs as being a matter
for the court's discretion, in line with the modem English
authorities.
In the Lord Nelson Hotel case, Smith 's judgment in Klymchuk
v. Cowan was approved by the court3 6 so that one of the barriers to
the development of the declaration as a commonly-sought
administrative law remedy has been removed. Nevertheless, a

30. [1952] O.R. 366; [1952] 3 D.L.R. 162 (Ont. C.A.).
31. See e.g. Warren, supra, note 2 at pp. 616-617 and Reid, supra, note 9
at pp. 364-365.
32. See de Smith, supra, note 14 at pp. 460-462 and Zamir, supra, note 2
at pp. 96-97.
33. See Zamir, supra, note 2 at pp. 96-101 and pp. 229-230.
34. "The Supreme Court of Canada and Administrative Law, 1949 - 1971"
(1973) 11 O.H.L.J. 187 at pp. 195-196.
35. Supra, note 9.
36. Supra, note 4 at pp. 109-110.
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reservation should be entered. That part of Smith J's judgment cited
by the Appeal Division concluded with the following sentence: "A
declaration of invalidity should not normally be made in cases
3 7
where certiorari is available and will afford a complete remedy."
This emphasizes that even though this is a matter of discretion rather
than competence, the applicant for relief does still run a risk by
seeking a declaration in certiorari territory*38 This of course
leads back to Rule 5.01. Presumably, in the light of the
Appeal Division's interpretation of this Rule, the best course of
action, where an order in the nature of certiorari and a
declaration are both feasible remedies, will be to seek both
rather than choose one or the other.
(b) Locus Standi Required for Declaratory Relief. Notwithstanding the significance of the court's interpretation of the new
Rules and partial clarification of the place of the declaration in
situations where other forms of relief are available, the dominant
issue in the Lord Nelson Hotel case was one of locus standi. The
form in which it was presented to the court was reduced to the
basically simple problem of whether Lord Nelson Hotel Limited had
standing to challenge a decision of Halifax City rezoning a piece of
land neighbouring the site of the Lord Nelson Hotel. This rezoning
had been the result of an application by a developer who wanted to
build a seventeen storey hotel on the site, a use prohibited by the
then-existing zoning.
In the Trial Division of the Nova Scotia Supreme Court, Gillis J.
decided against Lord Nelson Hotel Ltd. on this issue.3 9 He held that
the company did not have standing to obtain any of the remedies
being sought - a declaration, prohibition or an injunction. The
principal reason for the decision against the applicant would seem to
rest in the following two extracts from the judgment: First, "I am of
the opinion, and find, that the rezoning of any piece of land is a
public matter, a matter in which not individual persons but the
general public have an interest." 40 Secondly, "The laws surrounding planning, I believe, expressly remove and deny, any cause
of action which might lie under the common law, against the City,

37.
38.
39.
40.

Ibid. at p. 110 citing from Klymchuk at p. 593.
To use Professor Garth Nettheim's phrase, supra, note 2.
Supra, note 4 and 17.
Ibid., at p. 776 (756).
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because of or arising from the re-zoning." 4 1 These two statements
suggest that matters of planning are of a special class and outside the
normal principles for the grant of standing to challenge statutory
decisions. This interpretation is further bolstered by a statement to
the effect that the Attorney-General as the guardian of the public
42
interest is the only appropriate applicant in a case such as this.
The judgment is however confused in that at other points the
judge seems to be viewing this question in terms of the normal tests
applied by the courts in making a decision on locus standi, at least
where a declaration and an injunction are being sought. "In order to
have a locus standi in this application, the plaintiff, in my opinion,
should have shown that it has a special interest, private interest, or
sufficient interest standing apart from, and affecting it differently,
from the way that are affected all the members of the general public
who are or may be affected." 43 A reference to Cowan v. C.B.C.44
also incorporates this test. Yet, if planning is a matter of solely
public interest, as suggested by the judge, there would seem to be
no place for the asking of this question. Private interests of all kinds
would seem to be excluded necessarily if the sole protected interest
is that of the public. Nevertheless, the additional question was asked
and also answered in the negative. The company's participation in
the zoning hearings and its status an an abutting landowner did not
give it the special kind of interest demanded by this test.
On both counts the trial judgment is suspect. If the common law
of standing has been modified by a particular statutory regime, one
would expect some indication of such a modification in the statute.
None was mentioned by the judge. Secondly, the finding by the
judge that the applicant did not have the special interest required to
obtain relief is very difficult to reconcile with Canadian decisions
where neighbours and abutting landowners have been granted
standing in planning matters without hesitation on the part of the
courts .45

41. Ibid., at p. 779 (758).
42. Ibid., at p. 778 (757) Gillis J. also seems to suggest that locus standi can still
be an issue even if the Attorney General is a party to the proceedings. This seems
quite contrary to authority.
43. Ibid., at p. 778 (757-758).
44. Ibid., at p. 777 (756-757). Cowan is reported at [1966] 2 O.R. 309; (1966) 56
D.L.R. (2d) 578 (Ont. C.A.).
45. See e.g. Wiswell v. Metropolitan Corporation of Greater Winnipeg [1965]
S.C.R. 512; (1965) 51 D.L.R. (2d) 754, L'Association des Propriitairesdes
JardinsTdchlnc. v. Dasken EnterprisesLtd. (1971) 26 D.L.R. (3d) 79(S.C.C.).
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Because of this, the reversal by the Appeal Division was not
unexpected. After reviewing various authorities on the question of
locus standi,4 6 Jones J.justified a finding of sufficient standing to
seek all three remedies in the following terms: "I am satisfied that
the recent application to rezone the Centennial lands does materially
affect the interests of the appellant, both in relation to its hotel
premises and the residential property situated on Spring Garden
Road. The position of the appellant is strengthened by the fact that it
47
exercised a right of appeal before the Planning Appeal Board."
However, the most significant point about this aspect of the
judgment is that the authorities referred to by Jones J. as his
justification for this conclusion contain different standing tests for
particular remedies. 4 8 From this it can be inferred that notwithstanding the ability to join applications for various remedies under Rule
5.01, there is still not a universal or generally applicable test for
determining locus standi in Nova Scotia. The peculiar standing
requirements for each remedy continue to exist, so that at least in
terms of the Lord Nelson decision, a stranger can never expect to be
awarded a declaration even though he might sometimes be granted
relief in the nature of certiorari and prohibition. 4 9 Rather the test for
5°
declaratory relief remains one of "material" or "peculiar affect".
Once again at this point, however, Ontario, despite its Judicial
Review Procedure Act, is in no different position from Nova
Scotia. 5 1 Standing still continues to be determined by the law as to
the particular mode of relief as it existed prior to the Act.
4.

Thorson v. Attorney-General(Canada)

Since the Lord Nelson decision, however, the Supreme Court of
Canada has delivered judgment in the case of Thorson v.

46. Supra, note 4 at pp. 768-773 (107-111).
47. Ibid., atp. 773(110).

48. At pp. 768-769 (107-108), Jones J. refers to various authorities which would
seem to indicate that no special interest is required to seek orders in the nature of
certiorariand prohibition.
49. Note, however, de Smith, supra, note 14 at p. 369 where it is noted that there
is no reported case in which a "stranger" has in fact obtained certiorari. See also
doubts expressed by D.C.M. Yardley, "Certiorari and the Problem of Locus
Standi" (1955) 71 L.Q.R. 388.

50. Supra, note4at p. 771 (109).
51. Re Township of Hamilton & Rito Investments Ltd. [1973] 1 0.R. 246 (Ont.

Div. Ct.).
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Attorney-General (Canada).52 It is almost certain that the holding
of the majority of the Supreme Court in that case will generate
attempts to argue for a more liberal or extended law of standing for
the declaration in an administrative law context.
As pointed out by the Appeal Division of the Nova Scotia
Supreme Court in the Lord Nelson case, 53 an applicant for
declaratory relief has been obliged traditionally to demonstrate that
the action complained of either interfered with his private rights or,
if a public right was involved, materially or peculiarly affected his
interests. This is a standard that has been applied not only in an
administrative law context but also in situations where a declaration
has been sought as to the constitutionality of legislation, both
primary and subordinate. 54 Moreover, in both kinds of case, it has
been accepted generally that a person is not specially affected
because the decision or legislation in issue potentially affects his
liability as a taxpayer. The only exception to this principle has been
in relation to ratepayers challenging the validity of the actions of
municipalities. 55 In this context, their status as a ratepayer has in
itself been held to be sufficient.
One of the main reasons normally advanced for the rigidity of the
standing requirements where public rights were involved was the
constitutional position of the Attorney-General as the protector of
the public interest and thus the appropriate person to initiate
litigation in such cases. This traditional role, however, is one that
bears little relationship to reality, particularly where the legislation
concerned or the decision in issue has been initiated by the
government of which the Attorney-General is a member or where
the matters complained of relate to the actions of Ministers of the
Crown, government departments or agencies, or governmentappointed tribunals. The practicalities of partisan politics and the
ambivalence of his position as both a member of the Cabinet and a
Law Officer of the Crown have virtually eliminated this function of
the Attorney-General.
The only other alternative open to indignant citizens has been to
try to persuade the Attorney-General to appear on the record as a
52. Supra, note 5.
53. Supra, note 4 at p. 771 (109).
54. Very well-discussed by Gordon Turriff, Note (1973) 7 U.B.C.L.R. 312,
discussing Jamieson v. Attorney-General of British Columbia (1972) 21 D.L.R.

(3d) 313; [197115 W.W.R. 600 (B.C.S.C.).
55. Macllreith v. Hart (1907) 39 S.C.R. 657.
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party to the proceedings, thus putting their own lack of standing
beyond question by the Courts. However, the discretion of the
Attorney-General to become involved in a relator action is
unreviewable by the courts 56 and a refusal not only left the private
individual without a cause of action but also left potentially ultra
vires legislation and potentially unlawful administrative action
immune from challenge except collaterally.
The applicant for a declaration in Thorson v. Attorney-General
(Canada) was in this very position. The Attorney-General of
Canada was not likely to challenge the validity of the Federal
Official Languages Act as guardian of the public interest and he had
57
refused to lend his support to an action brought by Mr. Thorson.
Accordingly, Thorson brought his own action for a declaration in
the hope that the Supreme Court would reverse its position on the
law of standing and taxpayers' class actions. This persistence was
rewarded ultimately by a 6-3 judgment of the Supreme Court of
Canada upholding his right to bring the action.S7a
Two questions emerge from the judgment for the purposes of the
present discussion. First, how precisely has the law of locus standi
been altered by the Thorson decision? Secondly, and this is no more
than a refinement of the first question, does Thorson contain
anything to indicate that questions of standing to seek a declaration
should now be treated differently in an administrative law as well as
a constitutional law context?
Laskin J's (as he then was) majority judgment in the Thorson case
is a difficult one, for aside from acknowledging Thorson's standing
to bring the action, the extent to which the previous law has been
changed is not at all clear. One of the principle reasons for this
dilemma is that Laskin J., after indicating considerable doubts5 8
about the previous leading Supreme Court of Canada authority of
Smith v. Attorney-General of Canada,59 then distinguished the
situation in that case from the situation before the court in Thorson.
In Smith, a taxpayer was seeking a declaration as to the validity of
the Canada Temperance Act. His reason for doing this was because
56. See de Smith, supra, note 14 at p. 40-41.
57. Supra, note 5 at p. 7.
57a. The majority judgment was delivered by Laskin J. (as he then was) and was
concurred in by Martland, Ritchie, Spence, Pigeon and Dickson JJ. Judson J.
delivered a dissenting judgment, concurred in by Fauteux C. J., and Abbott J.
58. Supra, note 5 at p. 6 and pp. 8-9.

59. [1924]S.C.R. 331.
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a Montreal firm, in the light of prohibitions in the Act, had been
refusing to fill Smith's orders for liquor. The firm was simply
unwilling to risk prosecution by transporting the liquor from Quebec
to Ontario. Notwithstanding Smith's business interest in the matter
and notwithstanding the argument that he or his supplier should not
have to risk prosecution in order to have the constitutional issue
decided by a court, the Supreme Court of Canada denied Smith
standing to seek a declaration mainly on the ground that grave
public inconvenience would result from allowing people in his
60
position to come before the Courts.
In Thorson, Laskin J., in discussing Smith, asked the rhetorical
question: "Why, in such a case, should Smith be disqualified as a
plaintiff in a declaratory action and be compelled to violate the
statute and risk prosecution in order to raise the question of its
invalidity?"' 1 Superficially, this argument would seem to hold just
as much weight in an administrative law as in a constitutional law
context. Nevertheless, Laskin J. then went on to make it clear that
his holding in Thorson was confined to cases involving constitutional validity and also, quite paradoxically, to suggest that the risk
of prosecution argument was not really crucial. Indeed, the real
reason for deciding to accord standing to Thorson seems, from parts
of the judgment, to have been quite the converse of that argument:
"The Official Languages Act is not a regulatory type of statute akin
to the Canada Temperance Act which was involved in the Smith
case . . .The Act creates no offences and imposes no penalties...
Public officials only might be exposed to prosecution under S. 115
of the Criminal Code.''62 In other words, Thorson may have been
given standing because, unlike Smith, he did not even have the
opportunity to test the legislation by committing an offence under
the impugned Act.
Because of this, the holding in the case may well be restricted to
the following proposition: "Where there is a justiciable dispute as to
the constitutional validity of legislation and no other method of
testing its validity, the court may in its discretion grant standing to a
private individual without considering the position of the
Attorneys-General of Canada or the provinces.' ' 6 2 Seen in this
60. Ibid., at p. 337 (per DuffJ.).
61. Supra, note 5 at p. 9.
62. Ibid., at pp. 10-11.
62a. See, however, McNeil v. Nova Scotia Board of Censors and Sullivan
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light, the decision affords no comfort for those who look to the
judgment as having applicability to administrative law situations as
well as constitutional challenges. Indeed, the judgment may even
have the effect of reducing the availability of a remedy to ratepayers
against municipalities in so far as it focusses attention on the
discretionary nature of standing where the applicant is not
materially or peculiarly affected.
Quite recently, the English Court of Appeal was also called upon
to consider the role of the United Kingdom Attorney-General as the
guardian of the public interest. This arose in the administrative law
case of Attorney-General (on the relation of McWhirter) v.
Independent Broadcasting Authority, 63 which is mentioned in
passing by Laskin J. in Thorson. 64 Two judges of the Court of
Appeal were of the view that in an appropriate case the court might
allow a private citizen to institute proceedings on behalf of the
public interest if the Attorney-General refused to lend his support in
relator proceedings. However, the terms in which this proposition
was put forward were extremely guarded. According to Lord
Denning M.R.:
In the light of all this I am of the opinion that, in the last resort, if the
Attorney-General refuses leave in a proper case, or improperly or
unreasonably delays in giving leave or his machinery works too slowly,
then a member of the public, who has a sufficient interest can apply to
the court itself. He can apply for a declaration and, in a proper case, for
an injunction, joining the Attorney-General if need be, as defendant. In
these days when government departments and public authorities have
such great powers and influence, this is a most important safeguard for
the ordinary citizens of this country; so that they can see that65 those great
powers and influence are exercised in accordance with law.
Lawton L. J. was more cautious:
I agree with Lord Denning M. R. that if at any time in the future (and in
my judgment it is not the foreseeable future) there was reason to think
that an Attomey-General was refusing improperly to exercise his
powers, the courts might have to intervene to ensure that the law was
obeyed. 86

(N.S.S.C. - T.D., an unreported decision at Hart J. delivered April 30, 1974.)
where the court accorded standing to a taxpayer in a situation where there was a
regulatory statute with penal provisions. Hart J. decided that there was no effective
way for an individual citizen to challenge the constitutionality of the legislation in
question unless he was accorded standing in the declaratory proceedings.
63. [1973] 1 All E.R. 689(C.A.).
64. Supra, note 5 at p. 7.
65. Supra, note 63 at p. 698.
66. Ibid., at p. 705.
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Basically, this dicta does not add up to very much. The passing
remarks of two judges of the Court of Appeal over the vigorous
dissent of another6 7 scarcely amount to the creation of new rule in
this area. Moreover, even if the proposition is accepted, the courts
are predictably going to be extremely reluctant to find that an
Attorney-General has wrongfully refused to lend his support to
relator proceedings.
As far as Canada is concerned, there is little or no suggestion that
the courts are even prepared to go this far. Not only does Thorson
seem restricted to a constitutional law context but the Supreme
Court of Canada has recently affirmed the unreviewability of the
Attorney-General's discretion in matters involving the exercise of
prerogative powers. 6 8 Moreover, notwithstanding the Appeal
Division of the Nova Scotia Supreme Court's recognition of the
standing of a neighbouring property owner in the Lord Nelson case,
the Supreme Court of Canada has also recently refused to recognize
the standing of a homeowner's association which did not itself own
property in a case involving a challenge to a zoning decision. 6 9 For
declaratory relief in an administrative law context the need for the
applicant to demonstrate that he is specially affected remains a rigid
requirement and, at least as far as the courts are concerned, the day
of individual or group representation of the public interest in
litigation would seem to be as far away as ever.
All of this is not by any means to suggest that the courts should
dispense completely with standing requirements. However, I am
inclined to advocate that an extension of the Thorson approach to an
administrative law context would not be out of place. A
well-tempered use of judicial discretion would probably be an
adequate protection against the kind of difficulty envisaged by
Cairns L. J. in the McWhirter case when he stated that: "The
requirement for the consent of the Attorney-General is a useful
safeguard against merely cranky proceedings and against a
multiplicity of proceedings." ' 70 Moreover, as Laskin J. took pains
to point out in Thorson, the lesser standing requirements in
ratepayers' actions .... .. does not seem to have spawned any
67. Cairns L. J.
68. Smythe v. The Queen [1971] S.C.R. 680; (1971) 19 D.L.R. (3d) 480. The
matter was canvassed fully by Wells C.J.H.C. at first instance; see [1971] 2 O.R.
209; (1971) 17 D.L.R. (3d) 389 (Ont. H.C. & C.A.).
69. See Dasken Enterprisescase, supra, note 45.
70. Supra, note 63 at p. 703.
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inordinate number of ratepayers' actions to challenge the legality of
municipal expenditures."11 Indeed, many of the arguments used by
Laskin J. in Thorson point to the desirability of such a position in an
administrative law context, notwithstanding the fact that he himself
probably stopped short of taking such a position in his judgment.
5.

DeclarationsUnder the FederalCourtAct

(a)

GeneralAvailability

The Federal Court Act, which came into force in 1971, also has
ramifications with respect to the availability of declaratory relief in
this province. This Act subjects all statutory decision-makers
appointed under federal statutes, with very few exceptions, 72 to the
exclusive judicial review jurisdiction of the new Federal Court. This
has had the effect of excluding the previously-existing jurisdiction
of the provincial superior courts in judicial review matters
concerning federal statutory decision-makers.
The judicial review provisions of the Federal Court Act have a
number of puzzling aspects and I have already, in another context,
commented in detail on what essentially is a poor piece of
drafting. 73 As far as declaratory relief specifically is concerned, its
availability is affected by sections 18 and 28 of the Act which divide
up the original jurisdiction of the Federal Court in judicial review
matters between the Trial Division and the Appeal Division. Section
18 gives the Trial Division jurisdiction to issue a declaration along
with all the other traditional forms of relief. Section 28 on the other
hand creates a new remedy in matters where the Appeal Division or
Court of Appeal has original jurisdiction. Entitled an "application
71. Supra, note 5 at p. 7.
72. The term 'federal board, commission or other tribunal' is defined widely and
only excludes "person or persons appointed under or in accordance with a law of a
province or under section 96 of the British North America Act, 1867". Moreover,
even a section 96 appointee may be subject to the Act if he exercises power as
persona designata under a federal statute. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v.
Hernandez (1973) 14 C.C.C. (2d) 209 (S.C.C.) Note, however, that provincial
superior courts, notwithstanding the Act, retain authority to issue the writ of habeas
corpus to federal boards, commissions and other tribunals where appropriate. See
Re State of Wisconsin and Armstrong [1972] F.C. 1228 at p. 1232; (1972) 30
D.L.R. (3d) 727 at pp. 732-733 (F.C.A.) and Re Commonwealth of Virginia and
Cohen (No. 2) (1973) 1 O.R. (2d) 262 (Ont. H.C.). (Hernandez does not seem to
dismiss this possibility.)
73. "The Federal Court Act: A Misguided Attempt at Administrative Law
Reform?" (1973) 23 U.T.L.J. 14.
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for judicial review" it alone is available to the exclusion of Trial
Division jurisdiction, in situations where judicial review authority
has been conferred on the Appeal Division. In other words, by
virtue of section 28(3), the original jurisdiction of the two divisions
has been made mutually exclusive.
The major difficulty in this regard is in deciding in what
circumstances the Trial Division has original jurisdiction and in
what circumstances the Court of Appeal has original jurisdiction.
The actual wording of section 28 is most awkward and confusing
and, perhaps, the best that can be said is that (i) the Court of Appeal
has exclusive jurisdiction over decisions already made, as opposed
to matters or decisions which are pending, provided that, (ii) the
decision-maker in question is obliged in some way to act in a
judicial or a quasi-judicial manner in the course of taking the
decision.
Where does this leave the Trial Division in terms of original
jurisdiction and, more particularly, what scope does it leave for the
declaration under the Federal Court Act? First, in all cases where
decisions are pending, as opposed to where a final decision has
already been made, the ability to seek a declaration from the Trial
Division exists theoretically under the Federal Court Act,
irrespective of how the decision is classified. Secondly, where there
has been an actual decision, a declaration will only be available if
that decision is not one with a judicial or quasi-judicial element whatever that frightfully confusing term may mean. In other words,
to use Professor Garth Nettheim's phrase once again, there is no
place under the Federal Court Act for the declaration in certiorari
74
territory.
(b) Effect of StatutoryAppeal Rights
Aside from sections 18 and 28, the Federal Court Act ostensibly
only affects the availability of a declaration in two other respects
and, presumably, for all other purposes, the common law will apply
notwithstanding the fact that the Act creates a totally new
jurisdiction. The first of these other relevant provisions is section 29
which provides that where there is a right of appeal created by a
particular statute to the Federal Court, the Supreme Court, the
Governor in Council or the Treasury Board such right applies to the
74. Supra, note 2.
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exclusion of relief under both sections 18 and 28. In other words, in
certain cases, the appeal route must be utilized and judicial review is
specifically excluded as a possibility. This is opposed to the
common law position, where the most that can be said is that the
courts had a discretion, though not an obligation, to refuse to
entertain an action for a declaratory judgment where there was a
statutory right of appeal or, alternatively, a failure to exhaust that
75
statutory right of appeal.
However, two points must be made about section 29. First, it is
only applicable with respect to statutory appeals to the named
bodies. It does not apply to other statutory appeals. There the
common law continues. Secondly, it is also restricted in its
application "to the extent" of the statutory right of appeal. In other
words, if the statutory right of appeal is more limited than the
grounds upon which a declaration is available, then a declaration
may still be sought if the ground of complaint does not come within
the statutory appeal provision but does come with the scope of a
declaratory judgment. For example, assume the following situation:
First, availability of a declaration for intra-jurisdictional error of
law. 76 Secondly, statutory right of appeal for jurisdictional error
only to Federal Court of Appeal. Thirdly, alleged intrajurisdictional error of law by body not required to act in a judicial or
quasi-judicial manner. In such a case the appropriate relief to seek,
notwithstanding section 29, would be a declaration under section 18
of the Federal Court Act.
In brief summary, therefore, the general availability of a
declaration under the Federal Court Act may be more restricted than
it is at common law, at least with respect to the range of
decision-makers against whom it is available. Nevertheless, within
that restricted scope, the usual common law principles on such
matters as grounds of availability, standing and, for most part, the
effect of the availability of alternative remedies will continue to
govern.
(c)

DeclaratoryRelief againstthe FederalCrown

A matter of particular confusion in the drafting of the Federal Court
Act is in relation to the availability of declaratory relief against the
75. See Reid, supra, note 9 at pp. 442-443 and de Smith, supra, note 14
at pp. 374-376.
76. Perhaps a dubious assumption in the light of Punton v. Ministry of Pensions
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Crown, though so far this does not appear to have given any trouble
in the decided cases. Before the enactment of the Federal Court Act,
the availability of judicial review against the Crown in right of
Canada was in a rather uncertain state. 76a Clearly, at common law,
the prerogative writs were not available 7 7 and the only real
78
possibilities were declaratory and injunctive relief.
Historically, the only way of questioning the actions of the
Crown in the English courts was through the Petition of Right
procedure, a procedure which originally required the fiat of the
monarch and, latterly, that of the Attorney-General, whose
discretion to issue his fiat was not reviewable in the courts. The
79
procedure was accepted statutorily in Canada at the federal level,
though the need to obtain thefiat of the monarch's representative,
the Governor-General, was dispensed with in 1951.80
The availability of a Petition of Right depended on whether or not
the relief being sought came within the definition of 'relief' in the
Act. This defined 'relief' as including ".

.

. every species of relief

claimed or prayed for in a petition of right, whether a restitution of
any incorporeal right or a return of land and chattels, or payment of
money, or damages or otherwise." 8 1 As formulated this definition
did not specifically include relief of a declaratory nature. However,
in so far as declaratory relief amounted effectively to giving the kind
of relief encompassed by the definition, then it seemed clear that
declaratory relief was available against the Crown under the Petition

and National Insurance (No. 2) [1963] 2 All E.R. 693. See, however, Warren,
supra, note 2 at pp. 642-643 and Zamir, supra, note 2 at pp. 157-166.
76a. See Gordon F. Henderson's "Federal Administrative Tribunals in Relation to
the New Federal Court of Canada" [1971] Special Lectures of the Law Society of
Upper Canada 55 at pp. 60-62 and, more particularly, B.L. Strayer, Judicial
Review of Legislation in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1968),
Chapter 4, "Crown Prerogative and the Power of Judicial Review", and also B. L.
Strayer "Injunctions Against Crown Officers" (1964) 42 Canadian Bar Review 1.
77. Certiorari and prohibition:- Border Cities Press Club v. Attorney General
(Ontario) [1955] O.R. 14; [1955] 1 D.L.R. 404 (Ont. C.A.). Mandamus:- R. v.

Lords Commissioners of the Treasury (1872) L.R. 7 Q.B. 387.
78. There is no statutory prohibition against the award of an injunction against the
Crown in right of Canada. However, at common law, the remedy is not available
against the Crown. See de Smith, supra, note 14 at p. 397. See, however, Strayer,
supra, note 76a where a strong case is made for the availability in Canada of
injunctive relief against officers of the Crown in certain contexts.
79. 39 Vict., c.27 (1876).
80. S.C. 1951, c.33, s.1.

81. R.S.C. 1970, c. P-12, section 2.
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of Right Act. The case of Bradley v. The King8 2 illustrates this.
This decision involved the question of whether an individual had a
right to compensation, within the terms of the Patent Act, if the
Crown made use of a patented invention. In other words, was the
Crown subject to the compensation provisions of the Patent Act?
Bradley commenced proceedings in the Exchequer Court of Canada
under the Petition of Right Act for a declaration as to his entitlement
to such compensation from the Crown and the Supreme Court
upheld his right to bring these proceedings because the award of a
declaration in effect amounted to ". . . a judgment establishing his
right to appropriate relief [the payment of money] in the only form
in which it can be done in a judgment against the Crown. "8
At the same time as the Supreme Court in Bradley made it clear
that the Petition of Right procedure was available in such a case, it
was also asserted8 4 that a Petition of Right was not available for
declaratory relief of the kind which was awarded in the leading
English decision of Dyson v. Attorney-General.8 5 In that case an
individual was seeking a declaration to the effect that he did not
have to heed certain requisition notices which were issued against
him by the Commissioners of Finance. This amounted to the
seeking of a bare or mere declaration and was neither linked with
nor amounted to the kind of relief appearing in the definition of
'relief in the Petition of Right Act.
The Supreme Court judgment also went on to state that such
declaratory relief was not available from the Exchequer Court at all,
whether by way of Petition of Right or by way of action under
sections 18 and 19 of the Exchequer Court Act. 8 6 The question that
then arose was whether this meant that Dyson-like declaratory relief
was not available at all against the Federal Crown? Federally, there
was no provision expressly authorizing the issue of declaratory
relief against the Crown. Not only this but the Exchequer Court
Act8 7 also contained the following provision: "18. (1) The Court has
exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and determine the following
matters: (c) every claim against the Crown arising under any law of
82. [1941]S.C.R. 270; [194112 D.L.R. 737.

83. Ibid., at p. 277 and p. 743 (per Duff, C.J.).
84. Ibid., at p. 276 and p. 742.
85. [191111 K.B. 410 (C.A. - appeal on an interlocutory application to strike the
proceedings out); [1912] 1 Ch. 158 (C.A. - appeal on award of declaratory relief).
86. Supra, note 82 at p. 275 and p. 741.
87. R.S.C. 1970, c. E-l .
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Canada or any regulation made by the Governor in Council." On its
face this would seem to suggest that not only could a bare
declaration not be sought against the Crown in the Exchequer Court
but also that there was an express prohibition against seeking such
relief from a provincial court.
Nevertheless those provincial courts which considered this
question before the enactment of the Federal Court Act saw the
matter in a different light and held that a bare declaration was
available in provincial courts against the Federal Crown (or, more
precisely, the Attorney-General of Canada as representative of the
Crown in right of Canada). 88 The most detailed discussion of the
matter appears in the judgment of Hogg J. of the Ontario High Court
in Greenlees v. Attorney-Generalfor Canada.8 9 In reliance on the
presumption that where a right exists there is a remedy, he justified
the availability of such relief, though with little attention to the
actual exclusionary words of section 18.90 He also noted various
constitutional authorities9a to the effect that the provincial courts
exercise jurisdiction over federal matters for which a separate court
92
has not been established under section 101 of the B.N.A. Act.
In summary therefore, at the time of the enactment of the Federal
Court Act, the Exchequer Court of Canada had sole jurisdiction to
issue declaratory relief against the Federal Crown under the Petition
88. See Greenlees v. Attorney-General (Canada) [1945] O.R. 411; [1945] 2
D.L.R. 641 (Ont. H.C.); Gruen Watch Co. v. Attorney-General (Canada) [1950]
O.R. 429; [1950]4 D.L.R. 156 (Ont. H.C.); B.C. Packers v. Smith [1961] O.R.
596; (1961) 28 D.L.R. (2d) 711 (Ont. H.C.); Canadian Fishing Co. Ltd. v. C.
Rhodes-Smith [1962] S.C.R. 294; (1962) 32 D.L.R. (2d) 641. These cases are all
cited by Gordon F. Henderson, supra, note 76a at pp. 61-62. Both Greenlees and
Gruen went to the Ontario Court of Appeal but in neither case did that court
consider this issue. See [1946] O.R. 90; [1946] 1 D.L.R. 550 (Ont. C.A.) and
[1951] O.R. 360; [1951] 3 D.L.R. 18 (Ont. C.A.) (sub nom. Bulova Watch Co.
Ltd. v. Attorney-General (Canada)).
89. Ibid., at pp. 423-430 and pp. 652-659, respectively.
90. Ibid., at p. 429 and p. 659, citing Viscount Haldane in Board v. Board [1919]
A.C. 956 at p. 962;(1919) 48 D.L.R. 13 at p. 17-18. It should be noted that at that
time section 18 of the Exchequer Court Act was section 19 (R.S.C. 1927, c. 34).
Section 18 was also prefaced in the following way:- "The Exchequer Court shall
have exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases in which demand is made or relief
sought in respect of any matter which might, in England, be subject to a suit or
action against the Crown, and for greater certainty .
cf. Section 17, R.S.C.
1970, c. E-I 1, which does not include this preface.
91. Notably W.H.P. Clement, CanadianConstitution (Toronto: Carswell, 3rd ed.,
1916) at p. 595 and Valin v. Langlois (1879) 3 S.C.R. 1 at p. 19, per Ritchie
C.J.C.
92. Supra, note 88 at pp. 429-430 and p. 659.
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of Right Act where the relief sought was to the effect of granting or
was linked to 'relief' as defined in that Act. In contrast, no
jurisdiction existed in the Exchequer Court to issue a bare
declaration against the Federal Crown though provincial courts had
claimed such authority, despite the exclusionary wording of section
18 of the Exchequer Court Act.
It is now appropriate to consider the effect of the Federal Court
Act in the light of this background. First, section 64(1) of the
Federal Court Act not only repeals the Exchequer Court Act but also
repeals the Petition of Right Act. Secondly, section 17(1) provides
as follows: "The Trial Division has original jurisdiction in all cases
where relief is claimed against the Crown and, except where
otherwise provided, the Trial Division has exclusive original
jurisdiction in all such cases." Thirdly the definition section of the
Act, section 2 defines 'relief' in the following terms: "(m) 'relief
includes every species of relief whether by way of damages,
payment of money, injunction, declaration, restitution of an
incorporeal right, return of land or chattels or otherwise;..."
Perhaps the most significant aspect of these provisions in the new
Act is that 'relief' is defined as including declaratory relief. Under
the Petition of Right Act 'relief' was not defined so widely. Because
of this, it would seem to be very difficult indeed to maintain that the
provincial courts continue to possess any declaratory judgment
jurisdiction against the Federal Crown. Section 17 appears patently
clear in excluding this possibility by the use of the word 'relief'.
Indeed, this interpretation has already been accepted by Donnelly J.
of the Ontario High Court in Denison Mines Ltd. v. AttorneyGeneral of Canada,93 where a declaration was sought against the
Attorney-General of Canada respecting the constitutional validity of
a regulation promulgated under a Federal statute.
The interesting point that does arise, however, is whether the
Trial Division itself has any jurisdiction to issue a declaration
against the Federal Crown. Just because 'relief' is defined as
including a declaration and just because the Trial Division is given
exclusive original jurisdiction where 'relief' is being claimed
against the Crown, it does not necessarily mean that declaratory
relief is available against the Crown. Section 17 can be interpreted
as saying that in so far as the right to obtain relief against the Crown
93. [1973] 1 O.R. 797 at pp. 800-802; (1972) 32 D.L.R. (3d) 419 at pp. 422-426
(Ont. H.C.).
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exists, then it must be sought in the Trial Division. However,
section 17 does not itself create heads of relief. Separate statutory
justification for the kind of relief sought arguably must be
established before the Trial Division can take jurisdiction. The
effect of such an interpretation might not mean the end of
declaratory relief in so far as such relief is tied to or in effect the
kind of relief that is available under a particular statute. In other
words, the Bradley type of case might still be susceptible to the
granting of declaratory relief. However, in the absence of a specific
statutory authorization to the contrary, such an interpretation would
have the effect of ending the possibility of the issuance of a bare,
Dyson-type declaration against the Federal Crown. Indeed,
probably the strongest argument for such an interpretation stems
from the fact that in Dyson there was a specific statutory
authorization for the grant of declaratory relief. 94 No such specific
authorization seems to exist in the Federal Court Act. 95
In the Denison case, Donnelly J. assumed that the depriving of
provincial courts of jurisdiction to issue a declaration meant that the
Federal Court took over that jurisdiction. "Section 17(1) of the
Federal Court Act when read with s.2(m) is adequate to clothe the
Trial Division of the Federal Court with exclusive jurisdiction
where a declaration is sought in a matter that affects the Crown.' ,96
The principal basis for this assumption appears to be the extended
definition of 'relief .97 However, structurally there is an important
difference between the Federal Court Act and the Petition of Right
Act. The Petition of Right Act spelt out specifically the availability
94. R.S.C., Order 25, rule 5, (now Order 15, rule 16) which provides:- "No
action or proceeding shall be open to objection, on the ground that a merely
declaratory judgment or order is sought thereby, and the Court may make binding
declarations of right whether any consequential relief is or could be claimed or
not." Note, however, this rule is not expressed to be binding on the Crown and the
effect of this was not discussed at all in Dyson. (Discussed by de Smith, supra, note
14 at p. 429).

95. Prior to the Federal Court Act, the provincial courts which awarded
declaratory relief against the Crown relied on their province's equivalent of the
English rule. See e.g. section 18 (2) of the Judicature Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 228. Of
course, such use is subject to the same comment made by de Smith about Dyson namely, that section 18 (2) is not expressed to be binding on the Crown and express
provision to that effect is called for by section 11 of the Ontario Interpretation Act,
R.S.O. 1970, c. 227. However, there is not even the equivalent of section 18 (2) in
the Federal Court Act.
96. Supra, note 93 at p. 804 and p. 426.
97. Ibid., at p. 802 and p. 424.
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of a Petition of Right where any relief as defined was being sought
against the Crown. 98 The Federal Court Act does not contain any
specific authorization for the issue of a declaration.
In the last analysis the way in which such authority may be
established by the Federal Court-Trial Division is on the same basis
that Hogg J. proceeded in the Greenlees case; namely, that where
there is a right there must be assumed to be a remedy. Historically,
however, there would be difficulty in using such an approach. It
was quite clear that at the time of Confederation the English courts
would not, in the absence of express statutory authorization, issue a
purely declaratory order. 9 9 Indeed, the Exchequer Court of Canada
was held to be similarly limited in the Bradley case. 10 0
Furthermore, it is somewhat difficult to argue for the existence of
such an inherent jurisdiction in a court statutorily created in 1970
and particularly one which is expressed to be a continuation of the
Exchequer Court of Canada.
One further complicating factor is added by section 17(4) (b)
which provides that: "(4) The Trial Division has concurrent original
jurisdiction . . . (b) in proceedings in which relief is being sought
against any person for anything done or omitted to be done in the
performance of his duties as an officer or servant of the Crown."
Prior to the Act, aside from the Petition of Right procedure,
declarations were not sought against the Crown directly. The
normal practice, as indicated by Greenlees, was to sue the Crown
for a declaration through the federal Attorney-General. 10 1 In such a
case the Attorney-General was clearly not being challenged "for
anything done or omitted to be done in the performance of his duties as
an officer or servant of the Crown". He was no more than a
nominal defendant. This was in fact accepted by the Ontario High
Court in Denison Mines, where the Court held that such cases come
within section 17(1) rather than section 17(4) (b). 102 However, on
other occasions prior to the Act, it seemed appropriate to seek relief
against the Crown by way of an action for a declaration against a
servant of the Crown. For example, in The Canadian Fishing Co.
98. See section 3 and Form A in the Schedule to the Act, which, when read
together, necessarily indicate the availability by way of the Petition of Right
procedure of all forms of relief as defined in the definition section, section 2.
99. See Zamir, supra, note 2.
100. Supra, note 82.
101. Discussed by Hogg J., supra, note 89 at p. 430 and p. 659.
102. Supra, note 93 at pp. 800-802, (422-423).
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Ltd. v. Rhodes-Smith, 10 3 the Supreme Court of Canada awarded a
declaration against the Director of Investigation and Research of the
Restrictive Trade Practices Commission with respect to his actions
as a servant of the Crown. The question that now arises is whether a
litigant can avoid the exclusionary provisions of section 17(1) by
naming the appropriate Crown servant as defendant and suing in a
provincial court, since under section 17(4) (b), the Trial Division is
only given concurrent, not exclusive, original jurisdiction with
respect to actions against Crown servants or officers in matters
relating to the performance of their duties.
Another problem with respect to the position of the Crown under
the Federal Court Act is raised by section 18. As seen earlier this
gives the Trial Division exclusive original jurisdiction to issue
declaratory relief against 'any federal board, commission or other
tribunal'. Subsection (b) also goes on to provide that it has exclusive
original jurisdiction ". . . to hear and determine any application or
other proceeding for relief in the nature of relief contemplated by
paragraph (a), including any proceeding brought against the
Attorney-General of Canada, to obtain relief against a federal board,
commission or other tribunal." Given the wide definition of the
term 'federal board, commission or other tribunal' as including
virtually every statutory decision-making power established by
federal statute and given the creation of the ability to seek
declaratory relief against the Attorney-General, rather than the
person or body exercising the power, it may well be that this
constitutes the specific authorization for the issue of declaratory
relief against the Crown, an authorization which does not appear in
section 17.
There are however certain difficulties with this approach. First,
by virtue of section 16 of the Interpretation Act 104 the provisions of
an Act do not bind the Crown ". . . except only as therein
103. Supra, note 88. Note, however, the doubts often expressed about the
appropriateness of bringing an action for a declaration against a servant of the
Crown when he is acting as such rather than as persona designata under a statute.
See P. W. Hogg, Liability of the Crown (Melbourne: Law Book Co., 1971) at pp.
21-22; de Smith, supra, note 14 at pp. 454-455. See, however, Zamir, supra, note
2 at pp. 294-297 where he expresses the view that Crown servants may be sued in
such cases instead of the Attorney-General as representative of the Crown. This
issue was not discussed in Rhodes-Smith, and it may well be that the judgments in
the Supreme Court of Canada proceeded upon the basis that the director was acting
as persona designata and not as a servant or agent of the Crown.
104. R.S.C. 1970, c. 1-23.

118 The Dalhousie Law Journal

mentioned or referred to.," There is no specific statement in the
Federal Court Act that it binds the Crown generally nor is there a
specific provision in section 18 to the effect that the section binds
the Crown. However, it may be possible to argue that the Crown is
bound by the section by necessary implication. There are two strong
points to this argument. First, there is the wide definition of the term
'federal board, commission and other tribunal', a term which is
linked with the word 'any' in section 18 (a). Secondly, the only
occasion where it is necessary to sue the Attorney-General for
declaratory relief against another statutory decision-maker is where
that statutory decision-maker is the Crown. Accordingly, unless
section 18 is read as applying to the Crown, the latter part of section
18 (b) is completely lacking in substance. The only other difficulty
with this whole argument is section 17(4) (b). If it was intended that
section 18 bind the Crown and that the Trial Division have
'exclusive, original jurisdiction' in such matters, why does section
17(4) (b) only give the Trial Division 'concurrent original
jurisdiction' over matters involving relief against Crown officers or
servants with respect to the performance of their duties? Ultimately,
perhaps, the only way of resolving all these difficulties is to regard
section 17(4) as being applicable only to actions against Crown
servants in tort and contract and that, in the face of other strong
indications in the Act, declaratory relief of a public law nature
should be available against the Crown, either by way of suit against
the Attorney-General or, perhaps alternatively, by action against the
servant exercising the authority of the Crown10 5 under section 18.
105. In the reported cases, there has so far been only one instance where
declaratory relief has been sought against the Crown. In Robertson v. The Queen,
the Trial Division awarded a declaration as to the invalidity of certain regulations
against the Crown, without any discussion of this point. This was affirmed by the
Federal Court of Appeal. It is not clear from either decision whether the action was
brought under section 17 or section 18. See [1972] F.C. 80 (T.D.) and [1972] F.C.
796; (1972) 30 D.L.R. (3d) 383 (F.C.A.). However, in Minister of National
Revenue and the Queen v. Creative Shoes Ltd. [1972] F.C. 993; (1972) 29 D.L.R.
(3d) 89, (Sub nom Re Creative Shoes Ltd. v. Minister of National Revenue)

(reversed without reasons as against the Minister by the Supreme Court of Canada
(1973) 38 D.L.R. (3d) 318), an action under section 18 for relief in the nature of
certiorari, the Federal Court of Appeal held that the Crown was not a proper
defendant in that the Crown did not come within the definition of 'federal, board,
commission or other tribunal' in section 2(g). It may be, however, that this decision
is really not determinative of the availability of declaratory relief against the Crown
under section 18 in the sense that the decision-making process in issue in that case
did not involve the exercise by the Crown of any statutory power. This position
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At best, however, this is a somewhat artificial distinction though
perhaps one that is rendered necessary by the poor drafting and lack
of clarity in the legislation.
6.

Conclusions

This note has focussed on recent developments in the law affecting
the availability of declaratory relief as an administrative law remedy
in Nova Scotia. In some ways writing about a separate
administrative law remedy these days is misguided, particularly
having regard to the increasing tendency of legislatures to favour a
single comprehensive remedy and to make the procedures
surrounding the remedies much more equitable and consistent.
Nevertheless, by focussing on one remedy and one province, certain
insights can be gained into the changing face of remedial
administrative law.
In Nova Scotia, the new Rules of Civil Procedure and particularly
Rule 5.01, allowing for a combination of remedies in the one
proceeding, have led to a situation where the forms of proceeding
have been diminished in importance and where the substance of the
allegations is emphasized as the prime concern. Because of this,
there will be some tendency for the individual identity of the old
remedies to become lost which in most respects is a most desirable
advance. However, despite the ability to combine remedies in the
one proceeding, it will still be necessary for an applicant for relief to
make out his case for a particular remedy by reference to the
traditional rules governing their availability. In other words, the
standardization process is by no means complete though,
interestingly enough, this same situation continues to apply in
Ontario, notwithstanding the enactment of the Judicial Review
Procedure Act and the adoption of a single comprehensive judicial
review remedy.
However, to argue that Nova Scotia has achieved quite painlessly
much of what Ontario accomplished only after an extensive and
expensive study is not to say that the present situation is completely
satisfactory by any means. What still needs study are the actual
grounds for judicial review and, more particularly, a rationalization
of judicial review remedies with a properly worked-out system of
may well have been different if, for example, as in Robertson, the statute had
involved the exercise of a statutory decision-making power by the Governor in
Council.
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statutory administrative appeals. It is here that the hard work has
still to be done in this province. Moreover, the problems raised by
the common law of standing in an administrative law context, as
exemplified by Lord Nelson and Thorson, and also the problems
raised by greater public demand for effective representation in
agency decision-making and judicial scrutiny of the agencies,
suggest very strongly that attention should be paid to a clarification
of questions of standing to challenge administrative action on an
individualized statute by statute basis. Quite clearly there is no
standard answer to this question which can be applied in all
contexts.
Finally, perhaps as a warning that any kind of legislative reform
must be accompanied by careful statutory drafting, the lack of
clarity in the availability of declaratory relief against the Crown in
right of Canada ranks along with the other difficulties created by the
judicial review sections of the Federal Court Act. Notwithstanding
the fact that the Act marks some movement towards simplicity in
certain aspects of the availability of relief, it only adds to existing
confusion in other areas and cries out for amendment.

